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Abstract
A long-term relationship such as marriage will not operate efficiently without sanctions for misconduct, of
which adultery is one example.   Traditional  legal sanctions can be seen as  different combinations of various features,
differing in     who initiates punishment,  whether punishment is just a transfer or has real costs, who gets the transfer or
pays the costs,  whether the penalty is determined ex ante or ex post,  whether spousal rights are alienable,  and who is
punished.   Three typical sanctions, criminal penalties for adultery, the tort of alienation of affections, and the self-help
remedy of  justification    are formally modelled.  The penalties are then discussed in a variety of specific applications
to past and present Indiana law .
This will be a chapter in the forthcoming Marriage and Divorce: An Economic Perspective, edited by Anthony Dnes
and Robert Rowthorn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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    I would like to thank Lillian BeVier, Kevin Kordana, and participants at Purdue University and a  Federalist
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"Wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wife, to live together after God's ordinance in the holy estate of Matrimony?
Wilt thou love her, comfort her, honour, and keep her, in sickness and in health; and, forsaking all other, keep thee only
unto her, so long as ye both shall live?" (Book of Common Prayer, 1662 edition. Http://www.recus.org/1662.html
[January 2000])
1. INTRODUCTION
When two people marry, they promise fidelity.  Adultery occurs when one of them breaks this
promise, and it is generally believed that breaking promises, and breaking this promise in particular,
is  wrong.  “Every wrong has its remedy,” equity used to say.  The subject of this paper is which of the
myriad possible remedies are suitable for adultery.    In modern practice in the United States, the
remedy   is  that the wronged party can file for divorce and force a division of the assets.   This really
is   not a remedy,  however, since under modern no-fault  divorce laws anyone can file for divorce
anyway, no reason being required.   To the extent that divorce deters adultery, it does so simply as an
extension of adultery's tendency to  displease the injured spouse.   In the eyes of the law, adultery and
complaining about the other spouse's  adultery  are     equally good reasons for divorce.
In the past, other remedies existed  of which   vestiges   continue   today.  These include
criminal penalties, tort actions,     and self-help.   This chapter  discusses    remedies from a theoretical
point of view  using the tools of law-and-economics.  The approach will be to view adultery law as a3
problem in efficient contracting,  setting up a legal regime in which marriage is structured to
maximize  the net benefit of the husband and wife, with attention ,  where appropriate, to spillovers
onto third parties.  At its simplest, when such spillovers do not exist,  efficiency requires   adultery law
which replicates the marriage terms   husband and wife would choose if   transaction  costs were low.
Thus,  in this chapter  adultery  will be analyzed not as a problem of morals, or of maintaining an
orderly society, or of patriarchal domination, or of inalienable rights, but of  the welfare of individuals
as seen by   individuals.
2. THE MODE
2A. ASSUMPTIONS
 It will be  useful to set up a formal model to clarify thinking on the costs and benefits of
adultery even though   I will not use any algebraic manipulation  in this chapter.  For simplicity, let us
take the point of view of a Wife who is considering making an investment such as learning to love her
Husband more, giving up her job, or moving to a different city, an investment  which is useful only for
the sake of the marriage and which she will  regret making if her Husband turns out to be unfaithful.
(It  should be understood that “Husband”   in this model means “the spouse who is tempted by
adultery,” not “the male  spouse.”)     We will call the husband’s partner in adultery  "the Other
Woman".  Let us assume, too, that if the Wife does not invest in the marriage,  she will be willing to
divorce the Husband upon catching him in adultery, and that this threat would be sufficient to deter4
him.   If, however,  she has invested in the marriage, her threat to divorce him would  not  be credible;
she  would have too much to lose.
We will normalize the payoffs  of Husband and Wife to zero if  the  Wife does not invest in the
marriage.     The Wife's benefit if she invests  is B  if the Husband is faithful and  –C if he is not.  The
Husband receives benefit M from  the investment if he faithful and   A>M if he is adulterous.
1
The Wife may exert monitoring effort Xwife to increase the probability that  she detects adultery.
2
The Husband incurs cost f(Xwife) to find  a woman  with whom to commit adultery and cost Xhusband
(Xwife) to conceal it, representing the assumption that the Wife chooses Xwife first  and the Husband
decides whether to commit adultery and how much to spend to conceal it after he knows the Wife’s
level of monitoring. The probability that   adultery is detected, if it  exists, is a(Xwife, Xhusband), which
is decreasing or constant in Xhusband and increasing or constant in Xwife.    If adultery is detected, the
Husband  receives additional disutility Dhusband and  the wife receives additional utility Dwife, where
Dwife < C. In words, the Wife would rather not have invested  in an adulterous marriage  even if she is
sure to have the pleasure of catching the Husband.  The value  Dhusband is a  penalty that exists
                                                       
1  For many  people, the adultery payoff of  A would be less than  the fidelity payoff of M because of conscience costs,
but since such people need no  external deterrence to avoid adultery, whatever penalties might exist are irrelevant to
them and we will concentrate here on  those for whom A is positive.     Also, we will not rule out the possibility that A
>B+C, which says that the Husband’s benefit from the adultery is greater than the cost to the Wife, but, for simplicity,
we will  in this section ignore the possibility of side-payments from the  Husband to the Wife in exchange for her
acquiescence in  his adultery, an agreement  unenforceable in court.5
independently of the law and represents  such things as the Husband's embarassment at being caught
and the inconvenience of his Wife   knowing   the identity of  the Other Woman.
3
 The assumptions of the model say that  undetected adultery   hurts  the Wife and that she
benefits from detecting it, given that it occurs. Why this is so  is a difficult   question.
4      A partial
answer is that   the Wife  can deduce  that the Husband is committing adultery even if she fails to
detect it through her monitoring.   Why, however, do people try    to learn the specifics of negative
occurrences  even if they know they become unhappy?    We will  avoid the question by   falling  back
on the economic idea of revealed preference and using  the payoff function to represent  willingness to
expend resources to obtain particular outcomes, not  to represent psychological well-being.  Thus, the
assumption that the Wife obtains benefit Dwife from detecting the Husband’s adultery is equivalent to
her being willing to expend Dwife in resources to  detect it,  rather than saying anything about whether
she feels happier afterwards.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
2  have implicitly assumed that this probability is positive even with zero effort, since the Husband is deterred
from adultery by the threat of divorce if the Wife has not invested in the marriage.  Lillian BeVier suggested that the
Wife's effort could be socially useful. It could reduce, or, better, increase M.
3  By “independently of the law” I mean that the adultery penalty Dhusband will take the same value  if there is no
law concerning adultery.   We normally think of the law as increasing the penalty for adultery, but it is also
conceivable to have a law protecting adulterous husbands by punishing   wives who show their anger, in which case the
law could actually reduce Dhusband.  This sounds absurd, but   no-fault divorce has a similar effect, by allowing the
adulterous husband to divorce his wife if she bothers him too much about his affairs.
4  This issue arises in other contexts also, e.g. when an unconscious and injured  driver  has a blood sample taken
by police without his consent,         Breithaupt v. Abram (1957)   352 U.S. 432, or a gynecologist  rapes patients
without their  knowledge, People v. Minkowski  (1962) 204 Cal. App. 2d 832,  23 Cal. Rptr. 92.   The law does
recognize undetected harm:    in   Breithaupt the court acknowledged that the driver  suffered a loss from the sample
but held that it  was justified; in Minkowski, the court  held that  there was indeed harm and it was rape.6
2B ANALYSIS
Let us first consider what will happen in the absence of legal penalties.    The Wife will look
ahead and realize that she needs  to monitor if she is to deter the Husband's adultery after her
investment.   Two things could happen. First,  she might decide to make the investment and monitor
carefully, in which case the Husband will not even try to find the Other Woman.  Second, she might
decide  that deterrence is too expensive  and abandon investment in the marriage.
In this simple model, adultery never happens, because it is deterred either by the Wife's
precautions or by  her credible threat of divorce when she has not invested in the marriage.  There is
nonetheless, a welfare loss, and potentially a very large welfare loss.  This loss is created by the
deterrence itself,   the Wife's  precaution cost or the loss to   Husband and Wife if the Wife does not
invest.
In a more complicated model,   Husbands would differ in their benefits from adultery or costs of
avoiding detection. Then  adultery  would occur in equilibrium, which would create two further costs,
the direct  loss B+C to the Wife and the adultery transaction  cost  Xhusband to the Husband.
Adding a legal penalty for adultery is   adding  a penalty, P, to  the detection embarassment,
Dhusband.  To deter adultery  efficiently, the penalty must  be large enough that even if the Wife spends7
nothing on monitoring, setting Xwife=0, the Husband will find the expected payoff from adultery too
low to justify its transaction costs.   In that case, the Husband will be deterred, the Wife will feel
secure in using her time investing in the marriage  and not in  monitoring, and social surplus will be
maximized at the value   B+M.   Both parties would be happy to accept extraordinary penalties for
adultery, ex ante.   The Husband would   accept   heavy  adultery penalties because being aware of the
penalty  he will never become liable for punishment.
5
It has often been noted, both in  contracts generally and   marriage in particular, that long-term
relationships need penalties for breach  and that both parties will freely agree to become liable to
punishment.
6   Indeed, that is the very idea of a contract.   Adultery is just one more example of a
breach that needs penalties.    Viewing the situation ex post, however, it is easy for commentators to
see such  penalties  as illegitimate  infringement of the Husband’s liberty.
7
                                                       
5   The model can be modified to add non-deterrable adultery. If it is really true that some people could not
prevent  themselves from committing adultery even if they were sure to be caught and to receive the death penalty—
something I doubt, but which others believe—that can be incorporated into the model as  a fixed probability that
adultery occurs beyond what is chosen by the husband.  The model would not change much
6  As Lilian BeVier pointed out to me, even in the absence of law,  long-term relationships can survive based on
mutual threats of retaliation for breach, something  my own writing has  discussed--- Eric Rasmusen, Games and
Information, Chapter 5, 2
nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell  (1994).    This requires sufficient interest  by both parties in the
future, however, and mutual vulnerability to breach, which is why courts are so useful.   Mutual threats are more likely
to work for minor offenses such as rude language  which are instantly detectable and where the benefit from a single
transgression is not worth risking later retaliation.  This  together with the  cost of   adjudication relative to the  alleged
harm  is why the  courts have  always stayed out of minor household disputes.
7   See, for example, Note (1991) "Constitutional  Barriers to  Civil  and Criminal  Restrictions on  Pre- and
Extramarital  Sex,”  104  Harvard   Law Review  1660 (1991).8
2C. EXTERNALITIES
So far we have  focussed entirely on the Husband and   Wife, in analogy to  contract law.
Adultery also  has spillovers, however— externalities, in economic terminology.   For  the Other
Woman-,  adultery is a beneficial spillover. For   other  people,  it is harmful.  Parents and children
dislike adultery, other  couples may be dismayed by   the bad example, and many people  dislike it in
their community for reasons  of religion, natural law, or  aesthetics.   Adultery  interests   outsiders just
as much as pollution,  racial discrimination,  environmental destruction,  and      new building
construction.  Adultery law is like land-use law,   regulation of how people live based on the  idea that
people in a community care about what their neighbors are doing.  Just as land-use law varies
dramatically among different communities, so we should expect adultery law to vary.
8
 Using the  model, if  the sum of  the benefits to the Husband and the Other Woman are
exceeded by the cost to the Wife and other people,    adultery will   be  inefficient. The Wife and the
outsiders would  be willing,  were it  feasible,  to pay   the Husband and the Other Woman enough that
they would refrain from adultery.  Transaction and organization  costs prevent this, and so  the
adultery occurs.  A law that   prevented  adultery would then  increase social surplus by leading to the
result to which all parties would agree if they could transact costlessly.9
The point that other people's desires matter  is often resisted, so it is worth making clear.  The
ideas of economic efficiency, wealth maximization, and Pareto optimality all rely on taking people’s
preferences as given, without the analyst judging their moral worth.   If a consumer says he likes
chocolate, the  chocolate-neutral  analyst does not say that banning chocolate  would create no harm.
Suppose the Husband  and Other Woman would pay $50,000 and   $40,000 for the right to commit
adultery, and   the Wife  and  one hundred outsiders would pay   $60,000 and $1,000  each to prevent
it.   The adultery is then  inefficient.   There is no need to ask whether the outsiders have “really   been
damaged"  or whether the externality “really exists".    If someone   would pay $1,000 to prevent an
act, the act   causes him damage, and the economist does not ask about motivation.   Whether the
outsiders’ objections are   religious or material, for example,  matters as little as the motivations
behind   the  Husband and Wife's desires.
9
 How much people  do  care about adultery  is an empirical question that would be reflected in
such things as  their  choices    in living location,    friends, and  spouses, and their  willingness to
trade votes on adultery for votes on tax policy in political logrolling.    A common traditional position
is that people should care about a society’s virtue.   A common  modern position is that they should
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
8   I have expanded on this point in Eric Rasmusen, “Of Sex and Drugs and Rock'n Roll: Law and Economics and
Social Regulation,” 21 Harv. J. L. & Public Policy 71-81 (1997).
9  The   puzzle of    undetected misbehavior's harm  does arise  again here. If the Husband is unfaithful  and  the
Wife knows, but the public does not, is the   public hurt? If not, then sanctions on the Wife for making the misconduct
public might be appropriate.    The same issue arises in cases of cruelty to animals; if the only harm was   unhappiness
from known cruelty,   the logical solution  is  to make secret animal torture legal, with penalties for anyone who tries to
bring it to public attention.10
not---  that people should not interfere in the private lives of others.
10        The present paper adopts a
neutral position, in accordance with the  economist’s usual pluralistic procedure of taking tastes as
given.
3. PENALTIES
3A. FEATURES OF PENALTIES
  Having established that efficiency requires some sort of penalty for adultery, let us consider the
possibilities.  A number of choices need to be made.
(a) Who initiates punishment?
Someone has authority to make the decision to initiate the formal process.  In a tort lawsuit, this
is the plaintiff; in a criminal prosecution it is the grand jury or   prosecutor.
(b)  Is the penalty a fine, or does it destroy real resources?   
                                                       
10 John Stuart Mill is an older proponent of this view, which is a major  theme of On Liberty. He makes clear
what modern legal treatments often do not, that he disapproves even of social disapproval of vice,  much less of legal
penalties.   To be consistent, advocates of this view might wish to  turn self-help on its head  and make illegal  behavior
that is ordinarily legal, if it is done from  bad motives.  Landlords in the United States are forbidden to deny rental to a
tenant because of his race, even though they are free to deny rental to him for other reasons.   In the case of adultery, a
regime that believed sexual behavior to be  within a person’s sphere of privacy   should  penalize the Wife if she tried
to punish the Husband by what were ordinarily legal  means—leaving him,  refusing to cooperate in household finances
or legal matters, and so forth.11
The penalty might be a money transfer,  involving no real resources, or it might be a penalty
such as confinement that hurts the Husband without benefiting someone else by the same amount.
(c)  Who gets the fine or pays for  inflicting the  real-resource penalty?
If a fine is paid, someone receives the fine and   benefits from the punishment. If the penalty
destroys real resources,  someone must pay for that destruction, and  bear a cost.
(d) Is the penalty determined before the offense, or afterwards?
The penalty can be set ex ante, before the harm occurs, or ex post, once  the damage is
measured. This is the difference between liquidated and compensatory damages in contract  and  the
difference between fixed and discretionary sentencing in criminal law.  Ex ante penalties help the
Husband make a more informed decision and are   cheaper to implement, but they may be far from the
damage in a particular case.
(e)  Can the wife alienate her rights, waiving the penalty?
It may be that the Wife can (i) stop the penalty from being imposed, or (ii) agree in advance to
do stop the penalty from being imposed.  If the Wife initiates the penalty process, she certainly can
stop the penalty from being imposed, simply by inaction.  It is a different matter, however, for her to
be able to  make a binding agreement to stop the penalty, something she may wish to do in exchange
for concessions from the Husband.  Also, even if the Wife does not  have the ability to initiate the12
penalty process, it may be that she can stop it—by being given the authority to veto criminal
prosecutions, for example.
(f) Who is punished—the Husband or  the Other Woman, or both?
The penalty could be imposed on either or both  of the two adulterers.
An adultery law could be constructed using any combination of  these features.  Since there are
six of them, each with at least two alternatives, there are  least   64 types of law (two to the sixth
power). Here,  we will  discuss just three representative laws: civil damages, criminal penalties, and
self help.
3B. CIVIL DAMAGES
Civil Damages.  The  Wife initiates punishment of a fine, which is paid to the wife and is variable
depending on the amount of damage.   The Wife can alienate her right to initiate punishment, and it is
the    Other Woman who  is punished.
Tort and contract law exist to  provide recourse for private injuries, when one person inflicts
damage on another. It would seem well suited to adultery: the Husband has breached his agreement
with the Wife, and the Other Woman   cooperated in his breach and  took actions which harmed the
Wife.   The situation has elements of breach of contract,  tortious interference with contract, and13
intentional tort.   In the context of the model,  one form of tort liability  would  be for the  Other
Woman   to be liable to the Wife for compensatory damages, amount B+C.  Let us   assume that the
Husband and the Other Woman can agree to cooperate in paying the penalty and other costs of
adultery, and, for the moment put aside the possibility of the    Wife  alienating her right to sue.  The
Wife  might monitor either  less  or more than she would if tort damages were not available,
depending on the  function a(Xwife, Xhusband).   On the one hand,  the possibility of compensation means
that adultery causes her less harm on net. If the detection probability a(Xwife, Xhusband)   is relatively
unresponsive to Xwife   the Wife’s main reason to monitor would be to raise the cost  to the Husband  of
finding the Other Woman  enough to forestall adultery, but  that reason disappears if she   is fully
compensated.    On the other hand,   if adultery does occur and she detects it, she can collect damages.
In either case, the Wife is more likely to invest in the marriage,   because the Other Woman's liability
reduces the loss to the Wife from investment followed by adultery.
One advantage of civil actions when  the Wife can alienate her right to sue  by agreeing to a
settlement, or waiving her right in advance of the adultery is that if the Husband and Other Woman
benefit more from adultery than the Wife loses, they will make a deal.  The Wife would sell her right
to sue, and all parties would save on the transaction costs of detecting  or  concealing the adultery.
This is a disadvantage, however, if spillovers   on outside parties are large,  since they are not part of
the deal;    in the example earlier, the Husband and Other Woman would  be willing to pay the Wife
$61,000 for her permission, but that does nothing to compensate for the $100,000 loss to outsiders.14
  A  key practical disadvantage  of civil  damages   is    that the  defendant may be judgement-
proof.  If the Other Woman cannot afford to pay  damages,  the Wife’s right to sue is irrelevant.  Since
many, perhaps most, people lack the wealth to pay damages  substantial   substantial enough to
compensate for a   wrecked marriage,  or perhaps even for the cost to the Wife of hiring a lawyer,
civil suits may     disappear as an effective penalty altogether.  This is a  standard economic  argument
for why civil suits and fines are not used  for  the various misbehaviors we call criminal (see section
7.2 of Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4
th edition, Boston: Little, Brown (1992)).   A
problem  special to  adultery is that the Husband and Wife  are financially interdependent.  Even if the
Other Woman paid the entire penalty, much of its deterrent effect would be nullified if the Husband,
as part of the household, were to receive half the penalty.  Or, if the Husband  aids the Other Woman
in paying the judgement, the household ends up paying damages to itself.
Another general disadvantage of civil suits is the cost of determining the size of the damage.   If
the plaintiff   gives 1/3 of his judgement to compensate his lawyer, the defendant spends about the
same amount,   and there is a competitive market for lawyers, then it must be that the cost of
establishing and measuring liability is about 2/3 of the size of the damage itself.   It is not necessary
that civil  judgements  be variable, of course. They could be fixed, like  workmen’s compensation for
the loss of  a particular body part.  The problem  would then arise  of plaintiffs choosing to sue even if15




Criminal Penalties. The state initiates    punishment  in the form of a  real penalty, whose cost is paid
by the state. The penalty is fixed, independent of the damage.  The Wife can  block the punishment
and can alienate her right to do so, and  both   Husband  and Other Woman are   punished.
Criminal law is used  for penalties for many kinds of intentional injuries. Punitive damages
are   used  for the same purpose in civil suits, but   punitive damages are never fixed ex ante and  the
person injured initiates the penalty process and receives its benefit.  Criminal law is often  used for
injuries whose main damage is not economic,  such as assault  and rape, which are   crimes even if the
physical damage is slight or nonexistent, which points towards possible appropriateness for     adultery
too.
One form of the law laid out above would  be for  adultery to be prosecuted at the discretion of
the county prosecutor on complaint by the Wife, with a sentence of five years in the state prison. If
this sentence is long enough, the   Husband  would  be deterred even if the Wife did  not exert special
effort to monitor him and     the Other Woman were willing to compensate him up to her own benefit
                                                       
11  See Eric Rasmusen, ``Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of Plaintiff Self16
from adultery.      This achieves the efficient outcome: the Wife can safely invest in the marriage, and
neither she nor the Husband incurs transaction costs.
Alienability  becomes relevant if the adultery is efficient from the point of view of the three
parties.       Unless the wife’s right to veto prosecution is alienable,   if the criminal penalty   is large
adultery will not occur  even if it is  efficient.  If  it  is alienable,  however, then  no harm results even
if  the state has set  the penalty    extremely high. The penalty will not be imposed anyway, because
the Wife will veto it in exchange for  compensation,  and the penalty   serves only as  the  starting
point for bargaining between her and  the  Husband.
12
Alienability does have two  disadvantages. First, if there are externalities to the public, these
will be ignored by the Wife  when she accepts  payment from the Husband and Other Woman to
tolerate the adultery.   This problem shows up in many areas of criminal law.  Victims  prefer to  free
the criminal to commit crimes against others rather than   forego extracting concessions from him;   an
employer, for example,  would rather be  reimbursed  for embezzlement   than  stop  his   criminal
employee stealing from   a  future employer.     The second disadvantage  is that alienability prevents
strategic precommitment.    The  penalty  is likely to be costly to the Wife as well as the Husband,
because of public shame or loss of the Husband's earning power.  Thus, she might veto prosecution
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Selection and Signalling,''   International Review of Law and Economics, 15: 323-345 (September 1995).
12  This perhaps helps explain why adultery prosecutions have never been common, despite the prevalence of
adultery laws. The law may be important, but only as a threat  the injured spouse could wield to extract concessions
from the adulterous spouse. To the extent that the law served this purpose, its penalties would not need to be imposed.17
because   it hurts the household.  She might actually benefit from  not being allowed to   veto
prosecution  because then the threat of  punishment becomes credible and the Husband  would be
deterred.  This paradox is not merely theoretical; it    is the justification for  the “zero-tolerance” rules
that  have become common for spousal assault.
13  In many jurisdictions, if a wife calls the police for
help when her husband hits her, if the police decide that he has indeed hit her, the criminal process
will proceed even if the wife objects.
  The  1962 Model Penal Code, proposed by the American Law Institute and  a strong influence
on  state criminal codes,  deliberately  decriminalized adultery, saying, "private immorality should be
beyond the reach of the penal law". Its primary reasons are that adultery laws were rarely enforced
anyway, that it would be costly to enforce them, and  that there is no reason to make something illegal
"simply because such behavior is widely thought to be immoral."   The ALI  recognized that adultery
laws are popular with voters and that the crime is not a victimless one, but regarded these as
unimportant points.
14
Non-enforcement  is a red herring.   Many crimes exist which are rarely prosecuted. A notorious
example is the Federal  Brady Bill, which  makes  attempts  by  felons to  buy guns illegal.  This is
much easier to prosecute than adultery, since the  government has in its hands written evidence that
                                                       
13  "Domestic Abuse Bills Gain Momentum in Legislatures," The National Law Journal, Rorie Sherman, , p. A9
(4 July  1994).
14  Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1980, Part II,  Article 213,  "Note
on Adultery and Fornication".18
the felon broke the law.  Yet in the  two years or so of its existence,  the government claimed to detect
some 186,000 violations, of which it chose to prosecute  just 7, about 1 in 20,000.
15    Even such an
uncontroversial crime as burglary is rarely prosecuted.   In 1994, only about 1.4 percent of burglaries
in the United States led to  conviction  and   0.8 percent to incarceration.
16   My impression is that the
real problem for  the American Law Institute  is that its members do not  think adultery is really
immoral, since they offer no grounds to differentiate adultery from other crimes, and they put no
weight on popular taste when it differs from their own.  The ALI certainly did not consider the
spillover argument explained in the present article, which is  in keeping with the general disdain for
retribution by   intellectuals of the 1950's.
3C. SELF HELP
Self Help. The Wife initiates punishment, a real penalty whose cost she pays and which is variable in
magnitude.  The Wife can alienate her right to inflict punishment and  she can punish both the
Husband   and the Other Woman.
                                                       
15   7 prosecutions in 17 months: "Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act," Report
to the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives,
GAO/GGD-96-22 Gun Control, January 1996. 186,000 illegal acts in the first 28 months: "Gun-Control Laws
Scrutinized After Empire State Shooting," Ron Scherer, The Christian Science Monitor ,February 27, 1997, p.3.19
“Self help”  refers to a private person being allowed to take actions which the state ordinarily
prohibits.
17     Ordinarily,   one person  cannot    take   away another person's furniture    and sell it.   A
creditor, however,  is  allowed do just that.   In the case of adultery, self help consists of the Wife
being  allowed to punish the adulterous Husband by actions that would ordinarily be illegal— by
dissipating assets,  leaving with the children,  refusing to help support him financially, assaulting him,
or even murder.  The law can  do this formally, by statute or case law,  or informally,  by non-
prosecution or jury nullification.   The right is alienable  if  the Wife loses her  defense for the criminal
act  and  is prosecuted as a normal defendant if  it is shown that she  agreed to the adultery.
Self help combines features of tort and criminal law. Like tort law, it is initiated by the offended
party  and the  penalty is variable.   Like criminal law, the penalty is a real cost.  Self help can be seen
as   privatized criminal law.  The Wife, not the State,  initiates the punishment and bears its cost, but
she is allowed to use violence, something the State ordinarily monopolizes.
   Self help has both advantages and disadvantages.  An advantage  is low transactions costs.
Although it  does not completely eliminate government costs, since the government still must
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
16  Patrick Langan and David Farrington, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime and Justice in the United States and  in
England and Wales, 1981-96, October 1998, NCJ 169284,   pages 19 and 29. In England,   0.6 percent of burglaries
lead to conviction and 0.2 percent-- 1 in 500--  to incarceration.
17  More narrowly, self help is used to refer to a private person being allowed to immediately  take an action that
otherwise requires going through a legal process, e.g., to repossess  an automobile used as collateral  without  waiting20
determine whether self help was justified,    clear cases  will avoid  lawyers and  courts altogether, and
penalties  can be variable without the need for a government factfinder to evaluate   damage.
Moreover, if the imposition  cost    is    increasing in  the  size of the penalty,  and   the Wife’s
satisfaction from a greater penalty    increases with the emotional damage of the adultery to her, then
she   will choose to inflict a larger penalty if the  damage   is greater. A Wife who did not really care
about adultery would  not   bother even scolding the Husband; a Wife who did care might kill him.
This contrasts with civil damages, which have the disadvantage that even an indifferent Wife would
pretend to be  hurt  in order to collect  the  damages.
    Self help also has disadvantages. If people  are systematically mistaken, and more mistaken
than courts  when evaluating whether their spouses are adulterous, self help will  move the amount of
punishment further from the optimum.  It puts the cost of mistakes  and the cost of inflicting
punishment on the victims, who may be ill-prepared to bear those costs.  It has real costs, unlike civil
damages.   And self help, like  civil  suits and  alienable criminal penalties,    takes no account of
spillovers on  the public.
4.    ADULTERY LAW  IN PRACTICE
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
for a  court’s order.  I use the term   to refer  generally to taking  actions that except for the special circumstances are
illegal.21
As one might expect  when  efficiency calls for a law,  diverse nations and times have provided
legal sanctions for adultery,  from the Bible's "Thou shalt not commit adultery"   up to the present day
United States.
18       Describing the law in any particular time and place is difficult because   much of it
has been unwritten, being  embodied  in prosecutorial policy, the attitude of juries, and the degree of
self help tolerated.    Even more than in most areas of the law, published cases are an unreliable guide
to what actually happens, since the especially shameful nature of the offense makes quiet resolution
attractive.  What I have done below  line with Richard Posner and Richard Epstein's good advice that
theorizing in the complete absence of real-world  examples is risky   is to choose a     sampling from
statutes and published opinions  of the state of Indiana  with some mention of  other jurisdictions,  to
illustrate the taxonomy I have laid out above.
19
4A CIVIL DAMAGES
                                                       
18   The commandment is   Exodus 20:14: " Thou shalt not  commit adultery,"   with specifics in Leviticus
20:10:"And the man that  committeth adultery with another man's wife, even he that committeth adultery  with his
neighbour's wife, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to  death."  Note that if the penalty was alienable,
we would expect it to usually  have been replaced by transfer of goods.   Chapter  8 of Posner and Silbaugh's 1996 book
is the best place to look for modern American laws relating to adultery.  See also Melissa Haggard,  “Note: Adultery: A
Comparison of Military Law and State Law and the Controversy this Causes Under our Constitution and Criminal
Justice System,”  Brandeis Law Journal, 37: 469, (Spring 1998-1999); and Jeremy Weinstein,   “Note: Adultery, Law,
and the State: A History,”  Hastings Law Journal  38: 195 (November 1986).
19  Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,  Chapter 2: Legal Theory, Moral Themes.
Harvard University Press, 1999.  Richard Epstein, "Life Boats, Desert Islands, adn the Poverty of Jurisprudence,"   68
Miss. L.J. 861-885 (Spring 1999).22
 The English common law's  formal remedy for   adultery was a civil action for damages.
Blackstone says,
"Adultery, or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it is, as a public crime, left by our laws to the coercion of
the spiritual courts; yet, considered as a civil injury (and surely there can be no greater,) the law gives a satisfaction to
the husband for it by action of trespass vi et armis against the adulterer, wherein the damages recovered are usually
very large and exemplary. But these are properly increased or diminished by circumstances; as the rank and fortune of
the plaintiff and defendant; the relation or connection between them; the seduction or otherwise of the wife, founded on
her previous behavior and character; and the husband's obligation by settlement or otherwise to provide for those
children, which he cannot but suspect to be spurious."
20
The common law has used two different causes of action  for adultery:  "alienation of affections" and
"criminal conversation".      The Second Restatement of Torts  (1977) describes them as follows:
@  683  ALIENATION OF SPOUSE'S AFFECTIONS
 One who purposely alienates one spouse's affections from the other spouse is subject to liability for the harm thus
caused to any of the other spouse's legally protected marital interests.
                                                       
20 Book 3, Chapter 8 of  Blackstone’s Commentaries,.   See also Book 4, Chapter 34,  where he discusses
adultery in the context of criminal law.    Blackstone is somewhat misleading, because the caveat about the spiritual
courts is crucial.  Until  their jurisdiction was limited in 1640, these courts actively prosecuted adultery, imposing
severe fines and jailing for nonpayment. See James Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Volume 2,
Chapter 25 (1883).   It is noteworthy that Macaulay's Indian Penal Code of 1860 made adultery a major crime,
prosecutable only at the husband's request,  even though  England rejected domestic  criminalization in 1858.23
@ 685  CRIMINAL CONVERSATION  WITH A SPOUSE
 One who has sexual intercourse with one spouse is subject to liability to the other spouse for the harm thus caused to
any of the other spouse's legally protected marital interests.
The elements of the two actions are  different.  The wrong in alienation of affections is
foreseen   damage to the relationship between husband and wife,    which    requires that  the marriage
not  have been in  ruins before the outsider interfered.
21  On the other hand, the action does not require
adultery, and even an interfering mother-in-law can be liable for breaking up a marriage.
22    Criminal
conversation, on the other hand,   is an unintentional tort  with strict liability.  The third party is liable
even if he did not know that the adulterous spouse was married.
23   A single act  is sufficient (though
perhaps with small damages), but a physical act is necessary.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Macaulay was perhaps enough of a utilitarian to recognize the spillover problem; Section 298 of his code also
criminalized deliberate insults against someone's religion.   Stephen, Volume 3, Chapter 33.
21  Comment h to @  683:  “Not only must the actor have caused a diminution of one spouse's affections for the
other by acts, but the acts must have been done for the very purpose of accomplishing this result.”
22  For  such a  case,  see  Beem v. Beem  193 Ind. 481; 141 N.E. 81(1923).  This case also illustrates the
requirement of malice.   The Indiana Supreme Court approves of the following jury instruction requested by the
defense but rejected by the trial judge  (at 489, italics from original): “… were they [the defendant parents] impelled by
a spirit of malice and ill will toward said plaintiff or were they acting in good faith and without malice and what they
considered for the best interest   of said Bruce. If the latter, your verdict should be for the defendants."  Note, however,
that an adulterous third party can rarely assert the defense that his motives in breaking up the marriage were
disinterested.
23  Comment f.  to @685: “Although knowledge or belief that a person is married is essential to liability for
alienation of affections under the rule stated in @ 683, neither knowledge nor belief is necessary to liability under the
rule stated in this Section.  One who has sexual relations with a married person takes the risk that he or she is married
to another.  The fact that the spouse misrepresents the marital status is not a defense.”24
Indiana abolished both of these   in 1935, in  "An Act to promote public morals, by abolishing
civil causes of action for breach of promise to marry, alienation of affections . . ."
24   In 1999  Indiana
Code § 34-12-2-1a  still specifically prohibits those causes of action, along with breach of promise and
seduction.   The prohibition was tested in 1937  when a   suit against obnoxious in-laws    argued that
since  Article 1, Section 12   of the Indiana Constitution said, “every man, for injury done to him in his
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. . . .,"  the abolition of
alienation of affections was unconstitutional. The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed in Pennington v.
Stewart,212 Ind. 553;554;  10 N.E.2d 619 (1937), saying that neither person, property, nor reputation
were hurt and that marriage was  a matter  not of contract or property but of a status that falls under
the regulatory power of the state.
25
Alienation of affections has gone out of style as a tort, an exception to the general increase of
tort liability in the United States.
26   Oddly enough,  the   similar action of tortious interference with
contract is alive and well.
27  The Restatement says:
                                                       
24  As cited in Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553;554;  10 N.E.2d 619 (1937).
25   That marriage is not a contract  is a common finding in American courts. A more recent example is  In re the
Marriage of Franks, 189  Colo 499, 542 P.2d 845 (1975)  (en  banc) which rejected the   argument  that a no-fault
divorce law  violated  the contracts clause of  the state constitution when it nullified existing marriage contracts.   The
Pennington Court did  rule unconstitutional a provision of the 1935 act which made the plaintiff liable to a criminal penalty of
from one to five years of prison   for even trying to bring an action for alienation of affections.
26   Like Indiana, many states abolished   alienation of affections in the 1930's, and the topic was actively discussed
in  law reviews then. See Weinstein at 220.   England abolished crimninal conversation  by Stat. 20 & 21 Vict. ch. 85,
sched. 59 (1857) and  enticement by  Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970, sched. 5. Two states in which
the tort is still alive are Illinois and North Carolina. "Alienated-affections case ends in $ 11,667 verdict,"  Chicago
Daily Law Bulletin, Carol Sander, p. 3 (28 July 1997);    "Personal Negligence: Alienation of Affection 90,001 Verdict:
Emotional Distress,"  Personal Injury Verdict Reviews,  7:  22  (24 November  1999).25
@ 766 INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT BY THIRD PERSON
 One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry)
between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to
perform the contract.
Note the exception for marriage.  As in so many areas of the law,   marital agreements receive
substantially less protection than commercial agreements. Whether a prenuptial agreement executed as
a commercial contract would expose a third party to liability for tortious interference is an interesting
question   not  yet tested in any court,  to my knowledge.
4b CRIMINAL PENALTIES
   Until   1976, Indiana made adultery a crime, as some states still do,
28 but in that year the law
was repealed.
29   The pre-1976 law did not criminalize adultery per se.  Rather, as the Indiana
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
27  Tortious interference has received considerable attention from law-and-economics scholars. See William
Landes  & Richard   Posner   “Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis,” 9 J. Legal Stud. 517 (1980).
.Lillian BeVier   “Reconsidering Inducement,” 76 Virginia Law Review 877 (1990).  Fred  McChesney,  “Tortious
Interference with Contract versus "Efficient" Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence,” 28 Journal of Legal Studies
131 (January 1999).
28  Footnote 4 of Melissa Haggard, “Note: Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and State Law and the
Controversy this Causes Under our Constitution and Criminal Justice System,”  Brandeis Law Journal, 37: 469,
(Spring 1998-1999) gives cites for  24 state laws against adultery in 1998.  In New York, Virginia, North Dakota, and
Utah only the married adulterer is liable (Haggard, at 474).  See also Richard Posner  & Katharine Silbaugh,  A Guide
to America’s Sex Laws,  Chicago: University  of Chicago Press (1996).   In Minnesota and North Dakota, the  injured26
Supreme Court put it in Warner v. State, 202 Ind. 479; 483; 175 N.E. 661(1931), “The offenses
prohibited by the statute here involved (although sometimes inaccurately referred to as "adultery" and
"fornication") are cohabiting with another in a state of adultery or fornication…. The design of this
law is not to affix a penalty for the violation of the Seventh Commandment, but to punish those who,
without lawful marriage, live together in the manner of husband and wife.” Occasional, or even
frequent acts of adultery were not criminal by themselves; “cohabitation” was an essential element of
the crime.
What this suggests is that the criminalization of adultery was aimed not so much at protection of
the victimized spouse (who had, until 1935, civil damages and divorce-for-fault  available) but at
protecting the public from the consequences of open and notorious adultery.   Whether the ill
consequences of public immorality was  thought to be direct offense to the feelings of the public or a
tendency to corrupt  others is unclear,  but   damage to the  non-adulterous spouse was not the main
concern.  If public feeling in Indiana changed by 1976, then it is quite possible that  the
criminalization of open adultery was efficient  earlier but  became inefficient due to social change.
30
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
spouse is explicitly authorized to block prosecution   Minn. Stat. Ann. 609.36; N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-20-09 (1997).
Adultery is still  actively prosecuted in the U.S. military. See   United States v. Green, 39 M.J. 606  (A.C.M.R. 1994). It
is also subject to federal law in  the White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910), Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916), Whitt v United States (1959, CA6 Ky) 261 F2d 907.
29   Indiana Code “§§ 35-1-82-1-- 35-1-82-3. [Repealed.]  COMPILER'S NOTES. This chapter, concerning incest,
cohabitation, and seduction, was repealed by Acts 1976, P.L. 148, § 24.”  Curiously, Indiana Code  § 34-15-5-1, on
slander, still says, “Every charge of incest, homosexuality, bestiality, fornication, adultery, or whoredom falsely made
against any person is actionable in the same manner as in the case of slanderous words charging a felony.”
30   A separate question is whether criminal (or other) laws against adultery somehow violate the state or Federal
constitution. At the Federal level, various opinions have said in dicta that adultery is a legitimate subject for criminal
law, but one never knows what the Supreme Court will do in the future.  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546, 552 (1961)27
Other kinds of penalties might also be best classified under “criminal penalties,” even though
they do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or indictment:   various  legal disabilities created
by commission of adultery.  I have only  been able to find one such disability currently in force in
Indiana:  elimination of any claim by an active  and continual adulterer and deserter to the estate of an
intestate spouse. 
31   In the past, other disabilities have also existed, particularly  in connection with
divorce.  Before Indiana adopted no-fault divorce in 1971, adultery  could be considered in division of
property, as well as being one of the  grounds that made  divorce available in the first place.
32
Moreover, under an “unclean hands”  statute  which codified earlier case law, a spouse’s adultery
barred  filing for divorce on the grounds of the other spouses’ adultery.
33
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Harlan, J. dissenting):  "[L]aws forbidding adultery, fornication, and homosexual practices . . . form a pattern so
deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis….I would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry,
however privately practiced."   Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498  (1965)  (Goldberg, J., concurring):  "The
State of Connecticut does have statutes, the constitutionality of which is beyond doubt, which prohibit adultery and
fornication."  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208 (1986): "[a] State might define the contractual commitment
necessary to become eligible for [marital] benefits to include a commitment of fidelity and then punish individuals for
breaching that contract."
31  Indiana Code  § 29-1-2-14 says, “If either a husband or wife shall have left the other and shall be living at the
time of his or her death in adultery, he or she as the case may be shall take no part of the estate of the deceased husband
or wife.” This   came up in reported cases as recently as the early 1990’s: Oliver v. Estate of Oliver, 554 N.E.2d. 8
(1990 Ind. App.  1
st) and Estate of Calcutt v. Calcutt, 6 N.E.2d 1288 (1991 Ind. App. 5
th).
32  As discussed in Clark v. Clark,  578 N.E.2d 747  (1991 Ind. App. 4
th).   The opinion starkly tells Mrs. Clark the
current state of the law, at 750, “Wife also argues when it awarded attorney fees and litigation expenses, the trial court
failed to consider that husband had taken another woman, that wife had not wanted the separation, and that it was solely
husband's idea. Wife is wrong. The court may not consider such matters when  dividing property in a dissolution of
marriage action.”
33   O'Connor v. O'Connor,  253 Ind. 295; 307  (1968) quotes the Indiana Code as saying  § 3-1202  that   "Divorces
shall not be granted for adultery in any of the following cases:… Third. When the party seeking the divorce has also
been guilty of adultery under such circumstances as would have entitled the opposite party, if innocent, to a decree,"
and notes that “The statute was originally passed in 1873 (Acts 1873, ch. 43, § 9, p. 107) but the doctrine had already
been recognized by case law.”28
4C SELF HELP
 Adultery being grounds for divorce   creates a penalty similar to self help in the sense that
adultery provides an excuse for the innocent spouse to do something that would otherwise be illegal:
to unilaterally terminate the marriage. Such a divorce is not self help in its purest form, however,
because it still requires petition to the courts. The innocent spouse cannot simply behave as if
unmarried (for example, marrying someone else) and then plead the other spouse’s adultery as an
excuse when later prosecuted or sued.   Self help   proper   consists of imposing a penalty without the
aid of  the courts but with their acquiescence when    the penalty would be an illegal act  except for the
justification of adultery.  The most dramatic form   is  for  adultery to be a  legal justification for
killing someone.
34   Indiana has never formally allowed this, although  whether juries would  convict
a wronged spouse for murder is uncertain.  Their reluctance to do so is known as the "unwritten law,"
which   is pervasive enough across time and cultures   to make the relevance of  written laws suspect.
35
                                                       
34  Texas, Utah, New Mexico, and Georgia  all allowed adultery as an excuse for killing up until the 1970's,
Georgia by judicial interpretation and the other states by statute. See Weinstein at 232.  Interestingly, Texas did not
allow castration to replace killing:  Sensobaugh v. State 92 Tex. Crim. 417  (1922).   The first Georgia case on point
makes an interesting argument from jury nullification and democratic common law:  "Has an American jury ever
convicted a husband or father of murder or manslaughter, for killing the seducer of his wife or daughter? And with this
exceedingly broad and comprehensive enactment on our statute book, is it just to juries to brand them with perjury for
rendering such verdicts in this State? Is it not their right to determine whether, in reason or justice, it is not as justifiable
in the sight of Heaven and earth, to slay the murderer of the peace and respectability of a family, as one who forcibly
attacks habitation and property?" Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 728  (1860).
35  Three notorious examples from the United States are: (a) the 1994 sentencing of  husband Keith Peacock to just
18 months of imprisonment on work-release by a sympathetic judge ("She Strays, He Shoots, Judge Winks," New York29
Jury  instructions from Indiana judges,  however, would be  to convict, as the case law amply shows.
Adultery of the dead spouse can reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter,   but cannot excuse
the killing altogether, and the killing must have occurred immediately on discovery of the adultery for
the charge to be reduced at all.
  “The mere fact that one person had sexual intercourse with another person's wife will not justify the taking of
human life. Proof of this fact alone will be no defense in a prosecution for criminal homicide. The most it can do is, in
certain cases, to reduce the grade of the crime from murder to manslaughter. If a man finds another in the act of sexual
intercourse with his wife and kills him in a heat and transport of passion engendered thereby,  the crime will be
manslaughter only.” (Thrawley v. State, 153 Ind. 375; 378; 55 N.E. 95 [1899])
Indeed, a plausible interpretation of this doctrine is that  Indiana  is  not granting the killer a
discount from his prison sentence because he was engaged in self help,    but that murderous passion is
so typical of people who  discover adultery that it is a waste of time to s  debate whether such a person
has the state of mind that ordinarily qualifies a killing as manslaughter instead of murder.
Similarly,  adultery has generally not  been considered sufficient provocation to justify battery,
and  courts have held that the victims of  such battery are legally entitled to damages, including
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Times, p. A22  [22 October 1994]); (b) Lorena Bobbitt's acquittal for mutilating her husband ("Lorena Bobbitt
Acquitted In Mutilation of Husband," New York  Times,  David Margolick, p. 1 [Jan. 22, 1994]); and (c) the acquittal of
Congressman Daniel Sickles for murder of his wife's lover after a defense by attorney Edwin Stanton, later U.S.
Attorney General and Secretary of War ("It Didn't Start With O.J.;  Like the Simpson Saga, the 1859 Murder Trial of
Dan Sickles Gripped the Nation,"  The Washington Post, Daniel  Rezneck, p.C5 [24 July   1994]).30
punitive damages. This means that even if the prosecutor uses his discretion not to bring criminal
charges against the angry spouse, the  adulterous third party may sue on his own behalf. Whether the
jury will be sympathetic,  is again  questionable.
36
Self help also  comes up in less dramatic forms than murder and mayhem.   One    is for the
injured spouse to be exempt from what would otherwise be marital duties. The Indiana statutes of
1933 said,
     "Whosoever deserts his wife, except for the cause of adultery or other vicious or immoral conduct, leaving her
without reasonable means of support and continuing support, or whoever deserts his or her child or children and leaves
them, or any of them, without reasonable means of support and continuing support, or a charge upon any county or
township of this state, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction  thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state
prison not less than one year nor more than three years, and be disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any
office of trust or profit for a period of three years."
37
This is interesting not only for its disqualification of deadbeat dads as elected officials but for
the extent of its excuse of marital duties.   Not only may a man refuse to support his adulterous wife in
                                                       
36  Two cases show  what can happen.   Hamilton v Howard (1930) 234 Ky 321  involved  appeal from erroneous
jury  instructions by a trial judge that if  the plaintiff   victim  of three gunshots in the legs  had attempted to alienate the
affections of the  defendant's wife,  defendant would not be liable. The appeals court reversed and remanded, but noted
that the jury could take provocation into account in setting punitive damages, which were the bulk of  the claim.
Chykirda v Yanush (1945) 131 Conn 565  was an appeal from  an award of $72 to a supposed alienator of affections
who was the target of battery. The    jury said  the $72 included both compensatory and punitive damages, and the
appellate court ruled that the jury was justified in considering provocation in the setting of the punitive damages.31
the style to which she is accustomed; he may abandon her and their children entirely, to the extent that
they must live on public charity.   It is  a clear example of self help, and   of one of the difficulties
mentioned earlier in this paper:    even if the husband were    free to hurt the adulterous one, he  might
find it painful. The law allowed a man to   impoverish his children,  no doubt to the unhappiness of his
wife, but this hurts the punisher as much as the punished--at least if they really are his children.
38
 Thus, currently, Indiana  law has almost no penalties for adultery, but in the past  it has used
tort law, criminal law, and self help, in different ways and  perhaps to achieve different objectives.
Tort law has   deterrent and compensatory effects for the wealthy; the self-help remedy of reduced
penalties for wronged  spouses   provides  deterrence  for the   judgement-proof,   and criminal law
prevents open  adultery from offending public feelings and corrupting public manners.  The most
important penalty may have been  adultery   as grounds for divorce and   in the terms of divorce, a
mixed penalty which,  like a criminal penalty   is   not proportionate to damage,    but which, like a
civil  penalty,  is imposed at the initiative of the  injured spouse and to his or her benefit.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
37  Crumley v. State, 204 Ind. 396; 399;  184 N.E. 533 (1933), citing “Section 2866 Burns 1926, Acts 1913, p. 956,
ch. 358, § 1.”
38  If   the husband's paternity  was a legal presumption in Indiana at that time,  one purpose of  the desertion
statute might  have been  to   amend that presumption for practical purposes.32
It  is important to have some legal remedy for adultery. Civil damages, criminal law, and self
help all have their advantages and disadvantages.  The law need not restrict itself to one of these,  and
traditionally  has used all three.    This article has laid out a theoretical framework for thinking about
adultery law, but which laws are best   depends heavily  on empirical  magnitudes  such as the strength
of  public offense,   the  size of  damage to   injured spouses,  and  the assets available for paying
judgements.  One policy which is clearly beneficial from the point of view of wealth maximization,
however,  is to allow people to opt into adultery penalties via prenuptial agreements.    The law could
allow people to opt into tort, criminal, or self-help penalties as they are now free to opt into certain
kinds of  financial arrangements. This would require specific statutes for criminal and self-help
penalties, since they are not standardly available  as penalties for breach of contract. For civil
damages,  it would merely  require  dependable government enforcement of contracts, though
statutory clarification that such contracts would be enforced would  help.   The argument is the same
as for  contract   enforceability in general:   it permits a disjunction of mutual performances and
encourages reliance on future performance.
39    Some contracts, such as those for      price-fixing   or
murder-for hire, have negative spillovers onto third parties and should not be enforced, but if
spillovers are nonexistent or positive,  court enforcement is a public good.  Whether the law should go
                                                       
39  For  detailed discussion see Lloyd Cohen,  “Marriage, Divorce,  and Quasi  Rents; Or,"I Gave  Him the Best
Years of My Life”,”16 Journal of Legal Studies, 267 (1987).; Eric Rasmusen  & Jeffrey Stake,``Lifting the Veil of
Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract,''  Indiana Law Journal, 73: 454-502 (Spring 1998); and   Jeffrey
Stake,  “Mandatory Planning  for Divorce,”  45 Vanderbilt Law Review 397 (1992).  On the confused current state of
the law on enforcing these agreements, see also  Laura Graham,   "The  Uniform Premarital  Agreement Act and
Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of  Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage,"  Wake Forest
Law Review, 28:1037 (1993); and Theodore Haas,  “The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual  Restrictions  on
Divorce,”  66  North Carolina Law Review  879 (1988).33
beyond this, and  include   penalties for adultery as the default for    every marriage contract or even
require marriage to include them, is a more difficult matter,  depending on the size of spillovers.
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